From Berkshire Annual Meeting 2008

• Munger : The key is not to be seduced by crazy ideas, but instead just stick to the fundamentals year after year. Academia doesn't get too interested in us -- we're too simple. What would the professors do? A great many of the formulas [they use to analyze securities and markets] are dead wrong. They exist purely to give the intellectual class something to do. We don't do anything just exercise our intellectual proclivity for mathematical formulas."
• Then Buffet said one of the most remarkable things I've ever heard him say: "There's no reason we should become fearful if a stock goes down. If a stock goes down 50%, I'd look forward to it. In fact, I would offer you a significant sum of money if you could give me the opportunity for all of my stocks to go down 50% over the next month."
• Q: You said before that one of the things you look for in businesses you're buying is good managers. To me, that's a hard judgment to make if you haven't known him for long on a personal level. How do you go about figuring that out about somebody?
  WB: We're buying businesses where the managers come with it, so I do have a record [I can judge]. If I had to pick out the five people in this group here who would be the best managers, I wouldn't know how to do it. I mean, you all have great IQs, great academic records. You've all shown the energy to get into school.
• Can I pick out the five best? I don't think I can do it. What I can do, when I've seen somebody run a business for 20 years, is decide whether they're going to keep behaving in the future as they have in the past. So when I buy a business - it's the biggest question I ask - "Do they love the money, or do they love the business?" [One giveaway is] if they auction the business. We've never bought a business at an auction.
  I got a fax from a fellow named Peter Liegl from Forest River. I said, "Pete, send me the last few audits and I'll call you tomorrow" Never met him, never heard of the company. (It's a RV company.) So I called him that afternoon. I said, "Pete, here's what I'll do. And if it works for you, fine." I'd never met the guy, but I could still tell by just the way he presented it and his thinking on it.
  I said to him, "Pete, what kind of salary would you like"; this is a company that did a billion seven last year. That's not the way they teach you to do it in business school, but I don't want anybody working for me that has a compensation system they're unhappy with. And he said, "I don't know." And I said, "Well, just tell me because I want you to be happy. You have to run this thing." "Well," he took a little while, "Well," he said, "I looked at the proxy statement, you make $100,000. I wouldn't want to make more than you do." So that became his salary.
  I said, "I want you to have a percentage interest in future earnings above this level," which we worked out. But he offered $100,000 and I offered the percentage above that. I've never seen this place. I hope it's there. [Laughter] Pete may have some 11-year-old kid in there that says, "What figure shall we send Warren?" [Laughter]
  He doesn't need the job. As long as that thing is a lot of fun for him, he's going to keep running it. [I get offered all] kinds of deals from LBO operators. I would just love to bet against the projections of every one that they give me. They hand me these books, which I don't even want to look at, and of course they always just project like that [points upward like a graph that only increases]. I would just love to make a career out of betting against the figures presented in those books, but I don't get a chance to do that. If you ever get a chance to short investment banker books, that would be a great activity.
  
• We don't think about cost of capital or risk-adjusted. I mean, we don't want to take any risk, and we don't. That doesn't mean we don't do things that are wrong, but we are not doing anything that risks real losses.
  
  And as I said earlier [regarding stock holdings], we would have sold the thing to do something that offered even better opportunity. If it's going to permanently lose money, I reserve the right to sell it, and if it has labor problems, I reserve the right to sell it. They've been there for 20-plus years, those principles. But we believe in them. We follow through on them.
  The smaller capital expenditures, or even fairly large ones at the subsidiaries, they just do them themselves. They don't need me, because if some guy comes in to me and talks about something in the yarn plant or something in Georgia, what the hell do I know about it? If I say the internal rate of return we demand is 15.83, it'll be 15.84. I mean, you just can bet on it. We don't go through those charades. And it saves my time, saves their time.
  
• There isn't one security that I've got in the portfolio that I look at as-in terms of risky - in the sense of permanent capital loss. They can go down 50%.
  Berkshire Hathaway (BRKA, Fortune 500) stock itself has gone down 50% three times since I bought the first stock in at 7 3/8. In 1974 it got cut in half. In 1987 it got cut in half. In 1998, 2000 or so it got cut in half. So that doesn't make any difference. I mean, I just don't worry about it. I worry about permanent loss of capital. I worry about making the right businesses. I worry about keeping the managers happy. Everything else pretty much takes care of itself.
• Berkshire Hathaway Inc. says its first-quarter profit fell 64%, because it recorded an unrealized $1.6 billion loss on its derivative contracts. BRK.A reported net income of $940 million, or $607 per share, in the quarter ended March 31. That's down significantly from the net income of $2.6 billion Berkshire generated a year ago.
  Warren Buffett, warned shareholders in his annual letter that the derivatives could make the company's earnings volatile. But Buffett predicted the derivatives will ultimately be profitable.
  The four analysts surveyed by Thomson Financial expected earnings per share of $1,476.99 on average.