John Templeton interview here.

Q: What signs helped you see that the U.S. technology bubble was about to burst back in 2000?
John Templeton: If you want to have a better performance than the crowd, you must do things differently from the crowd. Four years ago the crowd was piling into tech stocks. The prices went sky-high. I sold my clients' technology stocks, and sold a lot of them short. I have put these philosophies into a simple statement: Help people. When people are desperately trying to sell, help them and buy. When people are enthusiastically trying to buy, help them and sell.

Q: That's a good way to look at it.
John Templeton: That's mainly a joke.

From Buffett's 1961 partnership letter

(expect some goose-bumps) :

• I do not present the tabulations with the idea of indicting investment firms. My own record of investing such huge sums with restrictions on the degree of activity I might take in companies, would be no better, if as good.
• The first section consists of generally undervalued securities (general) where we have nothing to say about corporate policies and as to when the undervaluation may correct itself. This has been our largest category, and more money has been made here than in the other categories. We usually have large portions (5% to 10% of our total assets) in each of five or six generals, with smaller positions in another ten or fifteen.
• Sometimes these work out very fast; many times they take years. It is difficult at the time of purchase to know any specific reason why they should appreciate in price. However, because of this lack of glamour, they are available at very cheap prices. A lot of value can be obtained for the price paid. This substantial excess of value creates a comfortable margin of safety in each transaction.
• This individual margin of safety, coupled with a diversity of commitments creates a most attractive package of safety and appreciation potential.
• Over the years our timing of purchases has been considerably better than our timing of sales. We do not go into these with the idea of getting the last nickel, but are usually content selling out at some intermediate level between our purchase price and what we regard as fair value.
• The generals tend to behave market-wise very much in sympathy with the Dow.
• Just because something is cheap does not mean it is not going to go down.
• With abrupt downward movements in the market, this segment may very well down percentage-wise just as much as the Dow, and during sharply advancing years like 1961, this is the section of our portfolio that turns in the best results. It is, of course, also the most vulnerable in a declining market.
• Out second category consists of “work-outs.” These are securities whose financial results depend on corporate action rather than supply and demand factors created by buyers and sellers of securities. In other words, they are securities with a timetable where we can predict, when we will get how much. Corporate events such as mergers, liquidations, reorganizations, spin-offs, lead to work-outs.
• This category will produce reasonably stable earnings, a large extent irrespective of the Dow. Work-outs have produced our second largest category. At any given time, we may be in ten to fifteen of these; some just beginning and others in the late stage of their development.
• I believe in using borrowed money to offset a portion of our work-out portfolio since there is a high degree of safety in this category in terms of both even results and intermediate market behavior. Results, usually fall in the 10% to 20% range.
• My self-imposed limit regarding borrowing is 25% of partnership net worth.
• Final category is “control” situations where we control the company. Such operations should definitely be measured on the basis of several years.
• Conscious, of inflation, many people now feel that they are behaving in a conservative manner by buying blue chips although regardless of price-earnings ratios, dividend yield, etc. I feel this course of action is fraught with danger.
• There is nothing at all conservative about speculating to just how high a multiplier a greedy and capricious public will put on earnings.
• You will be right, over the course of many transactions, if your hypothesis is correct, your facts are correct, and your reasoning is correct.
• True conservatism is only possible through knowledge and reason.
• I feel the most objective test as to just how conservative our manner of investing is arises through evaluation of performance in down markets. Preferably these should involve a substantial decline the Dow.
• We have never suffered a realized loss of more than ½ of 1% of total net assets, and our ratio of total dollars of realized gains to total realized losses is something like 100 to 1.
• Of course, this reflects the fact that on balance we have been operating in an up market. However, there have been many opportunities for loss transactions even in markets such as these so I think the above facts have some significance.
• Our job is to pile up yearly advantages over the performance of the Dow without worrying too much about whether the absolute results in a gibes year are a plus or a minus.
• I would consider a year in which we were down 15% and the Dow declined 25% to be much superior to a year when both the partnership and the Dow advanced 20%.
• For the reasons outlined in my method of operation, our best years relative to the Dow are likely to be in declining or static markets.
• My father is sharing office space with us (he also shares the expenses) and doing a brokerage business in securities. I expect our overhead, excluding interest on borrowings and Nebraska Intangibles Tax, to run less than .5 of 1% of net assets.
• We have over 90 partners and probably 40 or so securities.
• We presently have partners residing in locations from California to Vermont, and net assets at the beginning of 1962 amounted to $1,178,500.00. Susie and I have an interest in the partnership amounting to $1,025,000.00.

From Seth klarmans margin of safety

From Seth Klarman's book.

• "Being a value investor can be a lonely undertaking. A value investor may experience poor, even horrendous, performance compared with that of other investors during prolonged periods of market overvaluation. "
• "For a value investor a pitch must not only be in the strike zone, it must be in his sweet spot. Above all, investors must always avoid swinging at bad pitches"
• Remember the reason you bought the investment, and if that no longer holds true, then sell the investment.
• "The trick of successful investors is to sell when they want to, not when they have to."
• "Maintaining moderate cash balances or owning securities that periodically throw off appreciable cash is likely to reduce the number of foregone opportunities."
• a. A bottoms up approach, searching via fundamental analysis.
• NPV and IRR are great tools for summarizing data. NPV is the discounted value of all future cash flows that the business is expected to generate. Use this when earnings are predictable and a discount rate can be chosen. When interest rates are unusually low, could cause inflated share prices.
• Analyze liquidation value. Understand what would be an orderly liquidation versus fire sale liquidation. Net working capital = Current Assets – Current Liabilities. Net working capital = Net Working Capital – all long-term liabilities. Operating losses deplete working capital. Look at off balance sheet liabilities, such as under-funded pension plans.
• "working capital / sales ratio" is worthwhile. Discount rates of 12% for first 5 years followed by 15%. These higher rates indicate "uncertainty". Also see insider purchasing.
• Book value is not very useful as a valuation yardstick.
• If you see a company selling inexpensively, ask , "What is wrong with this company?" Like Charles Munger, who advises investors to "invert, always invert. Bargains should be inspected and re-inspected for possible flaws."
• He cited that institutions frowned upon arbitrage plays, and certain companies within an industry were punished without merit. Many institutions cannot hold low-priced securities, and that in itself can create opportunity. He also cites year-end tax selling, which creates opportunities for value investors.
• "Some information is always elusive," hence need to live with incomplete information. Knowing all facts does not always lead to profit. The first 80% of the research is gathered in the first 20% of the time spent finding that research."
• "High uncertainty accompanied by low prices. By the time uncertainty resolved, prices rise." Make decisions quicker, without all of the information, and take advantage of the time others are delving into the same information. The extra time can cause the late and thorough investor to lose their margin of safety.
• "Investment research reducing large piles of information to manageable ones, distilling the investment wheat from the chaff. A lot of chaff and very little wheat.
• Bankrupt Companies Look for Net Operating Losses as a potential benefit. Beauty of investing in bankrupt companies is the complexity of the analysis. This complexity leads to potential opportunity, as many investors shy away from the complex analysis. He cites the example of expensing rather than capitalizing certain expenses.
• Look at off-balance sheet arrangements. (e.g. real estate and over-funded pension plans)
• "As a rule investors should avoid the common stock of bankrupt entities at virtually any price; the risks are great and the returns are very uncertain."
• "All investors must come to terms with relentless continuity of the investment process."

Interesting, Fred Schwed seemed to be fascinated by options back in 1930 :

In defense of the Pure Gamble : Perversely enough, it is the use of options as sheer speculation that exercises a malign fascination on this writer. I do not know of anyone else who has a good word to say about this form of gamble. It would however be monstrous to leave an impressionable reader with the idea that the buying of options is a reliable way to make money. Bu the practice has such few spokesmen that I have taken it on myself to suggest that is has at least as much to recommend it as more approved speculative methods. But before buying the option, at least mull over for a little while the fact that there exists a group of gentlemen who seem to be willing to wager that this stock is not going up in the next 30 days after all.

Most of the great speculators either ended their days in penury or cam sickeningly close to it one or more times. An interesting exception was Hetty Green, but Mrs Green was both a realist and a woman, few great speculators are either.

Statisticians of a nervous, sensitive sort, after a few experiences develop a prose style which would make a German nineteenth century meta physician envious.. Quote from WSJ... If the thoughtful reader will now read that statement backwards, he will discover that its original lucidity is not impaired.
When there is a boom and everyone is scrambling to buy, take everything and sell. Invest the proceeds into conservative bonds. No doubt what you sold will go much higher, but pay no attention to this - just wait for the depression which will come sooner or later. When this depression becomes a national catastrophe, sell your bonds and buy back stock. No doubt the stocks will go lower, again pay no attention. Repeat.